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Abstract We study and compare equilibrium platforms in models of unidimen-
sional electoral competition with two and four policy motivated parties. We first
analyze the plurality game, where the party getting the most votes is elected and
implements its proposed platform. Restrictions on the set of credible announce-
ments are needed to get existence of equilibria. Comparing equilibria with two and
four parties, we obtain that moderate parties react to the introduction of extreme
parties by proposing the same or more extreme equilibrium platforms. We then
study the proportional system, where the policy implemented is a weighted sum of
the proposals, with the voting shares as weights. Here, the existence of extreme
parties leads moderate ones to choose more centrist platforms. We finally test the
robustness of our results with respect to, first, the enlargement of the strategy space
to entry decisions and, second, to asymmetric distributions of voters’ blisspoints.
1 Introduction
The traditional model of electoral competition, known as the Downsian model, is
characterized by two key features. First, the political parties are able to commit to
the policy announced during the electoral campaign. Second, they do not care
about the policy implemented, their only goal being to get elected. When there are
two parties, the policy space is unidimensional and voters’ preferences satisfy some
conditions (single-peakedness, single-crossing), we end up with the median voter
theorem: the parties adopt the same position at equilibrium, this position
corresponding to the median voter’s ideal policy. Considering multidimensional
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voting or more than two parties leads to much less optimistic and clear-cut results.
In the first case, there is generically no equilibrium as shown for example by Plott
(1967). When there are more than two candidates and voting is sincere, Osborne
(1993) argues that an equilibrium is unlikely to exist.1
Although the Downsian approach has been the dominant model in political
economy for a long time, its basic premises are questionable. Parties do have policy
preferences and they happen to renege on their campaign promises. Roemer
(2001), building on work by Wittman (1983) and keeping the assumption of
commitment, develops a theory of political competition with parties having policy
preferences. In the one dimensional case, he shows that parties propose the median
ideal policy if there is no uncertainty, because parties must propose this policy in
order to win the election and to influence the policy implemented. However,
introducing uncertainty on the voting behavior of the citizens leads the parties to
propose differentiated policies at equilibrium.
If one acknowledges that parties attach some importance to the policy
implemented then commitment becomes an issue.2 Indeed, in a one shot game,
they should implement their preferred policy once they have been elected. Rational
voters anticipate this and do not believe any promise different from the ideal
policies of the parties. Matters are clearly different when the game is repeated.
Alesina (1988) shows that parties credibly converge to the center of the political
spectrum in a repeated elections setting. The basic idea supporting this result is that
the parties, who are risk averse, prefer to have a moderate policy for sure than
different extreme policies at random. In this model, voters are not strategic and the
result only stems from the interaction between the parties. Aragones and
Postlewaite (2000) consider also a repeated elections model, but with strategic
voters, who punish the parties implementing a policy different from the one
announced during the campaign. They obtain that the parties can credibly commit
to policies belonging to an interval centered on their ideal policies. If they
announce a platform too far away from their preferred one, the voters recognize
that their incentives to renege on their promise is too high and they punish the party
by not reelecting it in the future.
In this paper, we consider an electoral competition game with policy motivated
candidates. Mainly, two questions are addressed. First, we are interested in
knowing under which circumstances an equilibrium with more than two parties
exists. Second, we want to determine the impact on the political equilibrium,
starting from the standard two party case, of introducing extreme parties in the
analysis. Our interest for this question has been aroused by the development of
extreme political parties in many European countries, such as Italy, Belgium, the
Netherlands, Austria or France. We study a setting where parties and voters have
symmetric, single-peaked utility functions and where voting is sincere. The
distribution of the voters’ and parties’ preferred policies is also symmetric.3 Two
electoral rules are considered: plurality rule and proportional representation. In the
1 The issue of sincere vs. strategic voting does not arise in the model with two candidates where
the winner implements its announced policy. Indeed, deleting weakly dominated strategies
ensures that individuals vote for the party proposing the best platform from their point of view.
2 If parties are indifferent with respect to the policy implemented, as in the Downsian framework,
there is nothing outrageous in assuming that they stick to the policy announced during the
campaign.
3We consider later on asymmetric distributions of voters’ blisspoints.
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first case, the party obtaining the largest number of votes is elected and chooses a
policy. In the second case, the implemented policy is a weighted sum of the
platforms of the parties, where the weights correspond to the number of votes
received by the parties. This second framework has been adopted by Ortuño-Ortin
(1997) in the two party case.
In this setting, we first show that there is generally no equilibrium under
plurality rule with four parties, two moderates and two extremes, when any
announcement is credible. From the discussion above, we know that the
assumption of perfect commitment is not reasonable when parties are policy
motivated. We thus follow Aragones and Postlewaite (2000) and assume that there
exist credibility sets containing the credible announcements of a party. Under this
assumption, equilibria with four parties possibly exist. Compared to the two party
case, moderate parties propose either the same or more extreme policies. The
intuition is the following. We start with the equilibrium proposals with only two
parties, where each party proposes the credible policy that is closest to the median.
Faced with the introduction of two extreme parties, moderate parties get more
extreme if, by deviating, they attract more votes from extreme voters than they lose
from centrists, i.e. if there are not too many centrists in the voters population. On
the other hand, they cannot move closer to the center even if they wished since they
already are on the boundary of their credibility set. In other words, the centripetal
forces embedded in the plurality system are maximum with only two parties, and
the introduction of extreme parties can only dampen these forces and lead to more
extreme platforms from moderate parties.
Considering proportional representation, we find that an equilibrium with four
parties generally exists and that moderate parties choose more moderate platforms
than in the two party case. The intuition for this result goes as follows. Observe first
that, with a symmetrical equilibrium, the policy implemented is the one preferred
by the median voter. The left (moderate) party would thus like to decrease the
implemented policy. Compared with the two party case, the introduction of
extreme parties adds a new incentive for the left party to move closer to the median.
Such a move will increase the extreme left party share of the vote at the expense of
the left party, which is a very effective way to decrease the implemented policy
since the extreme left party platform is the most leftist among the policies
proposed. With an added incentive to move closer to the median, moderate parties
end up with more moderate platforms than without extreme parties.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the model. Section 3
studies plurality rule while Section 4 analyzes proportional representation.
Section 5 tests the robustness of our results with respect to, first, the enlargement
of the strategy space to entry decisions and, second, to asymmetric distributions of
voters’ blisspoints. Section 6 discusses our results and concludes. The proofs of the
propositions are in the Appendix.
2 The model
The set of possible policies isP= [−1,1]. There are four political parties: extreme left
(EL), left (L), right (R) and extreme right (ER). Their ideal policies are respectively
denoted bEL; bL; bR and bER , with 1 < bEL ¼ bER < bL ¼ bR < 0 .
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Preferences of party i, i = EL, L, R, ER, are given by a utility function vi : P ! R ,
assumed to be single-peaked and symmetric around its mode, bi .
Each voter has a single-peaked, symmetric utility function. The distribution of
voters’ ideal policies is given by a cumulative distribution function F over P. The
density function, f, is continuous everywhere. We assume in what follows that f is
symmetric around 0, except in Section 5.2. where we drop this assumption. Voting
is assumed to be sincere, that is an individual votes for the party whose platform is
closest to her ideal point. We denote by αi the platform proposed by party i = EL, L,
R, ER.
We study both the two party (L and R) and the four party (EL, L, R, ER) cases.
The number of votes received by each party is
nL ¼ F L þ R2
 
¼ 1 nR (1)
in the two party case where αL < αR and
nEL ¼ F EL þ L2
 
; (2a)
nL ¼ F L þ R2
 




nR ¼ F R þ ER2
 




nER ¼ 1 F R þ ER2
 
(2d)
in the four party case where αEL < αL < αR < αER.
We first consider plurality rule before turning to the proportional case.
3 Plurality rule
In this section, elections are held according to plurality rule. The party with the
largest number of votes is elected and implements its announced platform. In case
of a tie, each party is elected with equal probability. Each party’s goal is to
maximize its expected utility. Party j (j = EL, L, R, ER)’s expected utility is given
by: Y
j
EL; L; R; ERð Þ ¼
X
i¼EL;L;R;ER
i EL; L; R; ERð Þvj ið Þ;
where πi is the probability that party i gets elected.
In the rest of the section, with the exception of Proposition 1, we restrict the set
of platforms that can be credibly made by parties. We adopt a simple formulation,
which can be rationalized using the reputation model of Aragones and Postlewaite
(2000). The set of credible promises of party i is comprised in the interval
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bi  di; bi þ di½  , with i 2 EL; L; R; ERf g . We assume in the following that di =
d for all i. Moreover, the credibility intervals do not overlap: bEL þ d  bL  d;bL þ d  bR  d and bR þ d  bER  d . Observe in particular that this implies
that credible announcements of L (resp. R) are to the left (resp. right) of 0. If a party
makes an announcement outside the credibility set, then the voters believe it would
implement its ideal policy if elected.
We first study the equilibria with two political parties (L and R) and then with
four parties.
3.1 Two-party competition
In the standard Wittman model without uncertainty, the two parties announce the
ideal position of the median voter, namely 0. Here the only modification is that the
parties will not choose a policy outside the credible set. The equilibrium platforms
are then L ¼ bL þ d; R ¼ bR  d . There is still “maximal” convergence.
3.2 Four party competition
We first show that there are no equilibria with four parties when any announcement
is credible.
Proposition 1 Non existence of equilibria when any platform is credible
Assume that all platforms are credible and that, at equilibrium, policy an-
nouncements follow the same ranking as parties’ ideal policies: bi < bj ) i  j.
Then,
(i) There is no pure strategy symmetric equilibrium.
(ii)There is no asymmetric equilibrium if bEL ¼ bER  1=2 and
F bELð Þ ¼ 1 F bERð Þ  1=4: (3)
To prove part (i), we show that for any configuration of platforms whose
ranking is the same as the ideal points ranking, at least one party has an interest to
deviate marginally.4 To prove part (ii), we have to use non-marginal deviations, for
which the ranking of the proposed platforms differ from the ranking of ideal points.
The meaning of the two assumptions exposed in part (ii) is clear. The assumption
that bEL ¼ bER  1=2 makes sure that any extreme party prefers any policy on
its side of the median voter’s blisspoint to any policy on the other side. Moreover,
the EL (resp. ER) party prefers any policy to the left (resp. right) of x > 0 (resp. x <
0) to policy x. Both consequences seem very much in accord with our intuition of
what preferences of extreme parties should be. The second assumption guarantees
that an extreme party cannot win the elections outright by proposing its most
preferred policy. This puts an upperbound of one fourth on the proportion of voters
with more extreme views than that of any extreme party.
4 Except in the (symmetric) case where the two extreme parties are located at the boundaries of the
political spectrum and the two moderate parties tie for winning. In that case, extreme parties resort
to large deviations.
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Note also that we have not shown in Proposition 1 that equilibria where the
ranking of announcements is not the same as the ranking of parties’ ideal points fail
to exist. However, it seems to us highly improbable that voters would consider any
announced platform as credible. We thus restrict in the following the set of
platforms that can be credibly made by parties and give existence results when
credibility sets are imposed.
Proposition 2 Symmetric equilibria where central parties tie for victory
Assume that only platforms in the interval bi  d; bi þ d½  are credible for party
i ¼ EL; L; R; ER .
(i) For all d > 0 such that credibility intervals do not overlap, the platforms



















for all L 2 bL  d; bL þ d½  .
(ii) For all d > 0 such that credibility intervals do not overlap, the platforms
EL ¼ bEL  d; L ¼ bL þ d; R ¼ bR  d and ER ¼ bER þ d constitute an
equilibrium if













for all L 2 bL  d; bL þ d½  .
In the two kinds of equilibria described in this proposition, extreme parties are
sure losers whereas L and R tie for winning. Extreme parties would like to deviate
toward the extreme in order to induce the victory of the closest moderate party.
They cannot credibly make such a deviation because their platform lies on the
boundary of their credibility set. Condition (4), or in the second case, the more
restrictive condition (6) guarantees that they do not wish to deviate towards the
center. These conditions imply that the maximal number of votes obtained by an
extreme party is always lower than the number of votes obtained by at least one
moderate party, and therefore that extreme parties cannot win the election.
In the first equilibrium, moderate parties propose their most extreme credible
platform. They do not deviate toward the center. Consider for example party L. If it
deviates to the right, it attracts votes from centrist voters, who were previously
supporting party R. However, it also loses votes to the benefit of EL. Condition (5)
ensures that the net effect is negative and moreover that L loses more votes than R.
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As a consequence, R is elected for sure following such a move and L should not
deviate. Note that condition (5) can hold only if the density function f(.) has at least
two modes, so that such an equilibrium is excluded with a unimodal density
function.
On the other hand, the second equilibrium described in the proposition is
compatible with a unimodal density function. In this equilibrium, moderate parties
would like to deviate towards the center, for the reason that a lot of people are
concentrated there. Credibility prevents them from doing so.
In Proposition 2, extreme parties are sure losers.5 We investigate in the
following proposition whether there exist (symmetric) equilibria in which they
have some chance of winning.
Proposition 3 Symmetric equilibria where extreme parties tie for victory
Assume that only platforms in the interval bi  d; bi þ d½  are credible for party
i ¼ EL; L; R; ER .
(i) At an equilibrium in which EL and ER tie for victory and L and R are sure losers,
we necessarily have EL ¼ bEL þ d; L ¼ bL þ d; R ¼ bR  d and ER ¼bER  d .
(ii)A sufficient condition for the existence of such an equilibrium for d small


















 F min bEL  bL
2
; bL   (9)
and
vEL bL þ dð Þ > 12 vEL bEL þ dð Þ þ 12 vEL bER  dð Þ: (10)
The first part of the proposition identifies the only configuration of platforms
that could constitute an equilibrium where extreme parties tie for victory. Since, at
such an equilibrium, all parties have an incentive to deviate slightly towards the
5 In addition to Proposition 2, there may also exist equilibria where moderate parties tie for
winning by proposing their most preferred policy. First note that no other policy in the interior of
the moderate parties’ credibility intervals will be proposed at equilibrium, since moderates would
rather deviate either to win outright or to tie with a policy closer to their blisspoint. Moderates do
not deviate from their blisspoint if they cannot win by deviating. Locally, this requires that
2f 0ð Þ ¼ f L þ EL  dð Þ=2ð Þ, which is an extremely improbable event. Moreover, looking at
finite deviations would add so many demanding conditions that we just mention these potential
equilibria for the sake of completeness. Finally, note that such equilibria do not contradict our
main point that moderate platforms are more extreme with four than with two parties.
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center of the policy spectrum,6 they all propose their most moderate but still
credible platform.
The second part of the proposition identifies a sufficient condition for the
existence of such an equilibrium: condition (8), which says that people who prefer
the ideal policy of party EL (resp. ER) outnumber those who prefer the ideal policy
of L (resp. R). It does not then come as a surprise that an equilibrium with extreme
parties winning exist. We know from the discussion in the previous paragraph that
moderate parties are not tempted to make small deviations towards the extreme as it
would induce the sure victory of the furthest extreme party. The requirement that d
be small enough guarantees that they do not want to make large deviations either.
However, condition (8) is not necessary and one can find examples in which it
is violated and an equilibrium nevertheless exists. Therefore, even if L’s ideal
policy is more popular than EL’s, Lmay still lose the election at equilibrium. It will
be the case if, by deviating to the left from bL þ d , L obtains more votes than EL
but less votes than ER which becomes the only winner. Condition (9) gives a lower
bound on the popularity of EL’s ideal policy for an equilibrium with winning
extreme parties to exist. If EL’s popularity is less than this threshold, L becomes the
winner of the election when EL deviates to bEL  d . For this deviation to be in the
interest of EL, (10) must hold, that is EL must prefer that L be the winner alone
rather than a tie between EL and ER. This is a mild condition as it is satisfied as
soon as the utility function of EL is concave on bEL þ d; bER  d½  . Together,
conditions (9) and (10) then constitute sufficient conditions for the non-existence
of any equilibrium where extreme parties tie for winning.
4 Proportional representation
We now turn to the case of proportional representation. In this setting, the policy
implemented is not the announced policy of the party with the highest voting score
but a weighted average of the policies announced by the four parties, where the
weights correspond to the proportion of votes obtained by each party. This
corresponds to a special case of the analysis in Ortuño-Ortin (1997) for two party
competition. The policy implemented is given by
 ¼ nLL þ nRR (11)
and
 ¼ nELEL þ nLL þ nRR þ nERER; (12)
in the cases of two party and four party competition respectively. The payoff
function of party i is
Q
i EL; L; R; ERð Þ ¼ vi ð Þ:
As before we proceed in two steps, describing first the equilibrium of the two
party game and then the four party game.
6 the extreme parties in order to win, the moderates to make the closest extreme party win.
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4.1 Two party competition
We describe in the following proposition the symmetric equilibrium when there are
only two parties.
Proposition 4 A sufficient condition for the existence of a symmetric equilibrium
of the two party competition game is that F(x) be log concave ( f (x)/F(x) decreasing
with x). The platforms proposed by the parties at equilibrium are:
2PL ¼ 2PR ¼
 12f 0ð Þ if f 0ð Þ  12
1 if f 0ð Þ < 12
:
(
The logic of the proof is the following. From (1) and (11), the implemented
policy for given platforms αL and αR is
 ¼ F L þ R
2
 




At a symmetric equilibrium, α = 0. Necessary conditions for an interior
equilibrium are then that d=dL ¼ 0 and d=dR ¼ 0 , which are given by,
respectively, Eqs. (26) and (27) in the Appendix. Consider for example the case of
party L. On the one hand, increasing αL allows to increase the number of votes and
therefore the weight received by αL. It also decreases the weight received by the
platform proposed by party R. These two effects correspond to the first and third
term in (26). As long as αL < αR, the net effect is to decrease α. On the other hand,
increasing αL leads to a mechanical increase in α, for given weights. This effect is
represented by the second term in (26). At the interior solution, both effects cancel
out. Moreover, the condition that f (x)/F(x) be decreasing with x is sufficient to
guarantee that the second-order conditions are satisfied. As for the corner
equilibrium (αL=−1, αR = 1), we check that α is increasing in both αL and αR at the
equilibrium, meaning that no party has an incentive to deviate towards the center.
The condition we obtain on the hazard rate is mirrored in Ortuño-Ortin (1997,
Proposition 4). Our restricting to symmetric equilibria allows us to go further than
Ortuño-Ortin and to obtain information on the platforms proposed at equilibrium.
Their most striking characteristic is that they are independent of the parties’ most
preferred policies (as long as bL < 0 and thus that bR > 0 ). One can also show
that the interior equilibrium will emerge with all unimodal distributions of voters’
ideal points. Moreover, a non-unimodal distribution is a necessary but not
sufficient condition for the appearance of a corner equilibrium. Finally, note that in
all cases the policy that is implemented is that most preferred by the median voter.
A last remark concerns the existence of asymmetric equilibria. Indeed,
equilibria such that  ¼ bR (resp.  ¼ bL ) and d=dL ¼ 0 (resp. d=dR ¼ 0 )
cannot be a priori ruled out.
4.2 Four-party competition
Equilibria with four parties are analyzed in the following proposition.
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Proposition 5 Any completely interior symmetric equilibrium (−1 < αEL < αL) of
the four party competition game satisfies
d
dEL
¼ 12 f ELþL2
 
EL  Lð Þ þ F ELþL2
  ¼ 0;
L ¼  14F
ELþL
2ð Þ
2f 0ð Þ :
A sufficient condition for the second-order condition to be satisfied is that f(x)/
F(x) be decreasing in x.
If f (0) >1/2, any symmetric equilibrium is either completely or partially
1 ¼ EL < Lð Þ interior. In all cases, the platforms chosen by L and R are closer
to 0 than in the two party case.
The main difference between Propositions 4 and 5 is that moderate parties
platforms are closer to the median with four than with just two parties. This is true
whether the equilibrium is interior or not. Consider the case f (0) ≤ 1/2. In the two
party competition, the parties locate at the boundaries of the political space.
Moderate parties are then necessarily closer to the center when there are four
parties. Consider now the converse case f (0) > 1/2. This leads to an interior
equilibrium in the two party case. We show that whether the equilibrium with four
parties is completely or partially interior (a full corner solution is impossible in this
case), the moderate parties choose more centrist policies.
The intuition for this result runs as follows. Consider the consequences of an
increase in party L’s platform. The effects described after the statement of
Proposition 4 are still at work. On the one hand, the left party gains votes at the
expense of the right party, the electoral constitution then putting more weight on
the left platform and less on the right. On the other hand, for given weights
the implemented policy increases following the increase in the left’s platform.
Observe first that this second effect is smaller with four parties since the vote share
of the left is smaller F L þ Rð Þ=2Þ  F EL þ Lð Þ=2ð Þð Þð than with two parties
F L þ Rð Þ=2ð ÞÞð . Furthermore, another effect appears, since the left party now
loses votes to the extreme left, which in turn lowers the value of the implemented
policy. The net effect of the introduction of extreme parties is thus to make an
increase of the left party platform more appealing, resulting in a more moderate
platform at equilibrium. Notwithstanding this effect, the implemented policy is
unaffected by the number of parties since we concentrate on symmetric equilibria.
5 Robustness of the results
In this section, we test the robustness of our results with respect to, first, the
enlargement of the strategy space to entry decisions and, second, to asymmetric
distributions of voters’ blisspoints.
5.1 Entry in the political competition
In the previous section, we have restricted the strategy space of political parties to
(credible) policy platforms. This implicitly assumes that parties always find in their
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interest to run for elections. A first look at the results obtained suggests that this is
not always the case: in the equilibria identified by Proposition 2, an extreme party
would be better off by dropping out since it would allow the closest moderate party
to win provided all running parties keep the same platforms.
This argument implicitly assumes that whether to run and which platform to
propose are simultaneous decisions. We think that a better way to model these
choices is to assume that the decision to run is taken first and that the precise
platform is chosen later. A first justification for this sequence can be found in the fact
that conveying information on the platform proposed is a costly and time-consuming
process which requires the existence of a political machine. Such a machine also
takes time to build, and has to pre-exist at the time the platform is chosen. In our
model, we equate the decision to build such a machine with the decision to run. A
second justification results from the observation that the only activity of a party in
our model is to run for elections: a party which does not run is equivalent to having
no such party. One can then take a long run view and equate the decision to run and
the decision to form a party in order to influence elections results. Founding a party
implies sizeable stranded costs (in time, money and energy), so that parties’ lifespan
usually cover several rounds of elections. It then makes sense to model first the
decision to found a party and then after the selection of an electoral platform. This is
the strategy adopted by the related industrial organization literature: “Sunk costs are,
by definition, a multiperiod phenomenon, as is entry deterrence. For the modeling,
we will need an explicit dynamic model” (Tirole, 1992, p. 315).
We look for subgame perfect Nash equilibria (SPNE) of this sequential game.
Our objective is to assess which of the four party equilibria described in the
preceding sections survive the introduction of a prior stage where parties decide
whether to enter or not the political arena. For the plurality case, we obtain that the
equilibrium identified in Proposition 2 (ii) does not constitute a SPNE while those
of Propositions 2 (i) and 3 may still arise. In other words, taking into account the
decision to enter reinforces our point that the introduction of extreme parties
induces moderate parties to choose more extreme platforms. As for the
proportional case, we first obtain that all parties are indifferent whether to run
for elections or not if the three-party electoral competition results in a symmetric
equilibrium. On the other hand, we show by means of numerical simulations that
there exist three party asymmetric equilibria resulting in a worse outcome for the
party which does not run than the four-party (symmetric) equilibrium. In other
terms, the equilibrium depicted in Proposition 5 is a SPNE of the two-stage game at
least for certain configurations of the parameters.
We first address the plurality rule case and then turn to the proportional system.
5.1.1 Plurality rule
From the symmetry of our model, we only need to consider the entry decision of
two parties, for example L and EL, the problem being identical for R and ER. As
usual, this two-stage game is solved backward. We thus start by solving the
electoral competition stage. Since we concentrate on the four party equilibria, we
assume that parties other than the one under consideration run for elections. We
then compare, from this party’s viewpoint, whether its payoff is increased by
running for government when all other parties do so.
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Three party equilibria
a) Equilibrium if the extreme left party does not run
In this case, the only possible equilibrium is for L to win the elections by
proposing its most favored policy, bL . First note that L can always guarantee its
sure victory by moving close enough to bL þ d . Such a result is preferred by L
to any credible policy offered by a right party. Further observe that if L wins
with proposal L > bL , it has an incentive to deviate to the left. Hence, the only
possible equilibrium is for L to win the elections by proposing its most favored
policy, bL .
b) Equilibrium if the left party does not run
First, ER never wins at equilibrium since EL can always propose the platform
symmetrical to that chosen by ER (which it prefers to ER’s platform) and gather
more vote than ER. There are then three possible equilibria: EL wins for sure, R
wins for sure or they tie. By the same argument as presented above, when a
party i is a sure winner, its platform is necessarily bi , otherwise it should deviate
slightly towards its ideal policy.
Entry decision We now turn to the entry decision. We first argue that the situation
depicted in Proposition 2 (ii) is not a SPNE of the two-stage game, since any
extreme party would prefer not to run for elections in this case. Under Proposition 2
(ii), moderate parties tie for winning and the result is a lottery between policiesbL þ d and bR  d . Since both realizations are worse from EL’s viewpoint than
the sure bL it would get by not entering, EL prefers to stay out of the contest.
We then show that there exist configurations of parameters such that the
situations depicted in Propositions 2 (i) and 3 are SPNE, i.e. that both moderate and
extreme parties fare better when running for elections. We concentrate on the three
party equilibrium in which EL is elected for sure when L stays out of the
competition. This requires that
nEL ¼ F bEL þ R2
 
> max nR ¼ F RþER2
  F bELþR2 ; nER ¼ 1 F RþER2 n o:
We start with Proposition 2 (i), where the two moderate parties adopt extreme
platforms and tie for victory. The conditions for L and EL to be better off by
entering are then respectively
1
2




vL bEL  dð Þ þ 12 vEL bR  dð Þ > vEL bLð Þ: (15)
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Resorting to numerical simulations,7 we show that conditions (13), (14) and (15)
can be satisfied simultaneously. In words, L prefers to enter in order to avoid the
implementation of an extreme policy by EL; EL wants to enter because it leads
party L to propose a more extreme policy.
We now show that Proposition 3 can be a SPNE too. In this equilibrium, the two
extreme parties are tying for victory when the four parties run for election. The
conditions for L and EL to be better off by entering are then respectively
1
2




vEL bEL þ dð Þ þ 12 vEL bER  dð Þ > vEL bLð Þ: (17)
Once again, we resort to a numerical simulation to show that conditions (13),
(16) and (17) can be satisfied simultaneously.8 In words, Lwants to enter because it
induces a more moderate choice by EL; EL wants to enter because it has a one half
chance of winning the elections.
We now turn to the proportional system.
5.1.2 Proportional system
As before, we examine the incentives to enter for the two leftist parties, L and EL.
We first compute the first-order conditions of any (interior) equilibrium where the
left party is the only one not to enter the race. In the case where this equilibrium is
symmetric, we obtain that the right party proposes the central policy and gathers
half of the votes while the other two parties each gather one fourth of the votes.9 As
in any symmetric equilibrium under proportional voting, the implemented policy is
0, and party L is indifferent between entering or not. Moreover, we obtain the same
equilibrium whatever the identity of the party which does not run for elections, i.e.
as long as two of the three parties are located on one side of the median voter’s
blisspoint.
More interesting is the possibility of a non-symmetric equilibrium. We obtain
that in any asymmetric equilibrium, the central party still gathers one half of the
votes while extreme parties always share unequally the remaining half. Comparing
with the four party (symmetric) equilibrium, we obtain that a party from, say, the left
has no incentive to drop out if not entering results in an asymmetric equilibriumwith
an implemented policy greater than zero. This is the case with the following cali-
7 In this simulation, we consider a bimodal distribution for the ideal points of the voters. The
preferred policies of the parties are bEL ¼ 0:8; bL ¼ 0:4; bR ¼ þ0:4; bER ¼ þ0:8 and
d = 0.1.
8 The parameter values that we use are the same as in the previous footnote. The only modification
concerns the ideal policies of the parties that become bEL ¼ 0:7; bL ¼ 0:3; bR ¼
þ0:3; bER ¼ þ0:7.
9 The second order conditions are satisfied if f(x)/F(x) is decreasing in x, as in Propositions 4
and 5.
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bration: the distribution of the citizens’ preferred policies is a Beta distribution10
with a = b = 2. At equilibrium, party L proposesαL= −0.67whereasR proposesαR =
0.44 and ER proposes αER = 0.83, resulting in an implemented policy of α = 0.014.
11 In this numerical example, all the parties enter the political competition in the first
stage. The (symmetric) SPNE of the two-stage game is then described by
Proposition 5.
5.2 Asymmetric distribution of blisspoints
The preceding sections study political competition in a perfectly symmetric
environment: the distribution of voters’ blisspoints, political parties’ blisspoints,
voters’ and parties’ utility functions are all symmetric. It is important to know to
what extent our results depend on these symmetry assumptions. To test the
robustness of our results, we relax the one symmetry assumption that seems the
most contestable, i.e. the voters’ blisspoints distribution. As suggested by an
associate editor, if one views these blisspoints as reflecting the voters’ income, a
positively skewed distribution would be more relevant. We now look at how an
asymmetric distribution of voters’ blisspoints affects our results, first under
proportional rule and then in the plurality case.
5.2.1 Proportional Rule
In this section, we show that the results obtained under a symmetric distribution of
voters’ blisspoints can easily be generalized to the case of an asymmetric
distribution, provided that left parties’ blisspoints are to the left of the median while
right parties’ blisspoints are to the right. Roughly speaking, the role played by
policy zero in the symmetric case is now played by the median policy, that we
denote by med. We still obtain that moderate parties locate closer to the median
when extreme parties are added.
In the two party case, we obtain the following result, which is a generalization
of Proposition 4.
Proposition 6 Keep all the assumptions described in Section 2 with two parties,
except that the distribution function f does not have to be symmetric and that we do
not impose the symmetry of parties’ ideal policies but simply require that bL <
med < bR. Sufficient conditions for the existence of asymmetric equilibrium of the
two party proportional game are that f(x)/F(x) be decreasing with x and f(x)/(1−
F(x)) be increasing with x. The platforms proposed by the parties at equilibrium are:
10 The density function of the Beta distribution is
f xð Þ ¼ 1
B a; bð Þ 1þ xð Þ
a1 1 xð Þb1;
where B a; bð Þ ¼ Rþ11 1þ sð Þa1 1 sð Þb1ds.
11 This equilibrium holds for any bL < 0:014 < bR < bER.
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L ¼ med  12f medð Þ (18)
R ¼ med þ 12f medð Þ (19)
in case of an interior equilibrium, i.e. if f medð Þ > max 12 1þmedð Þ ; 12 1medð Þ
n o
. The
implemented policy is the median one and each party receives one half of the votes.
With a positively skewed blisspoints’ distribution, we can have a full corner
equilibrium (αL = −1, αR = 1) or a partial corner equilibrium with (αL = −1, αR < 1).
In both cases, the left party has more than half of the votes and the implemented
policy is negative.
The four party case is given by the following proposition, which generalizes
Proposition 5.
Proposition 7 Keep all the assumptions described in Section 2 with four parties,
except that the distribution function f does not have to be symmetric and that we
do not impose the symmetry of parties platforms but simply require that
EL < L < med < R < ER . Any completely interior symmetric equilibrium
1 < EL < Lð Þ of the four party competition game satisfies
d
dEL
¼ 12 f ELþL2
 
EL  Lð Þ þ F ELþL2
  ¼ 0
L ¼ med  14F
ELþL
2ð Þ
2f medð Þ :
A sufficient condition for the second-order condition to be satisfied is that f (x)/
F(x) be decreasing in x and f(x)/(1−F(x)) be increasing in x.
In symmetric completely interior as well as (partially) corner equilibria, the
platforms chosen by L and R are closer to 0 than in the two party case.
We now turn to the plurality rule.
5.2.2 Plurality Rule
We assume wlog that the blisspoints’ distribution is positively skewed, so that med
< 0, and that bL þ d < med < bR  d . We first look at the equilibrium platforms
with two parties and plurality voting. It is easy to see that both parties will converge
as close to the median policy as credibility allows them to. Under the assumption
that bL ¼ bR and that the credibility intervals have the same length for all parties,
party L would then win the election for sure. We thus see a need to reformulate the
assumption of symmetry of parties’ blisspoints by assuming that they are







¼ nL bL; bRð Þ: (20)
Our first conclusion is then that the symmetry of the parties’ blisspoints has to
be redefined with respect to the median voter’s blisspoint. We do not try in this
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paper to endogeneize the parties’ blisspoints location and leave this topic for future
research. One can nevertheless conjecture that endogenous parties’ blisspoints
would satisfy condition (20) since it is a necessary condition for parties to influence
the implemented policy. If this condition is satisfied, we still obtain maximum
convergence towards the median.
Turning to the four party case, we need to impose that the two parties tying for
victory have the same number of votes at equilibrium. On the other hand, we do not
need to impose symmetry assumptions for the platforms of the loosing parties. In
other terms, loosing parties (the two extreme parties in Proposition 2 and the two
moderate in Proposition 3) need not have the same number of votes at equilibrium.
Moreover, the asymmetry of the distribution of voters’ blisspoints implies that
deviations incentives are typically different for leftist and rightist parties, and that
one cannot concentrate, as in the symmetric case, on one extreme and one moderate
party. More precisely, the conditions listed in Propositions 2 and 3 make sure that
parties L and EL have no interest in deviating from the equilibrium locations. For
these equilibria to carry through to the asymmetric distribution case, one must
explicitly impose similar conditions on parties R and ER.
To illustrate this, we present the following result, which is a generalization of
Proposition 2 (ii). Propositions 2 (i) and 3 are generalized in the same way and are
not reported here for the sake of space.12 The reader can check that conditions (22)
and (23) are equivalent to condition (6) when f is symmetric, while conditions (24)
and (25) collapse to condition (7). Condition (21) is necessarily satisfied under the
assumptions of Section 2.
Proposition 8 Asymmetric voters’ blisspoints distribution: Symmetric equilibria
where central parties tie for victory.
Keep all the assumptions described in Section 2 with four parties, except that the
distribution function f need not be symmetric. Assume that only platforms in the
interval bi  d; bi þ d½  are credible for party i ¼ EL; L; R; ER .






 F bL þ bEL
2
 
¼ F bR þ bER
2
 




F bLð Þ  F bL þ bR2
 




1 F bRð ÞF bR þ bER2
 













12 Statements of results and proofs are available upon request.
16 G. Casamatta, P. De Donder
for all L 2 bL  d; bL þ d½  and
2f








for all R 2 bR  d; bR þ d½  .
The conditions imposed on the rightists parties are very likely to remain satisfied
when one starts with an equilibrium under a symmetric distribution and perturbs a
little this distribution. In this sense, the results depicted in Section 3.2. are robust to
the introduction of a small asymmetry in the voters’ blisspoints distribution. This
reasoning is upheld by the results of the following simulation. We start with
a symmetrical Beta(5,5) distribution function f with bEL ¼ 0:8 ¼ bER; bL ¼
0:4 ¼ bR and d = 0.1. We check that the conditions listed in Proposition 2 (ii)
are satisfied so that there exists a symmetrical equilibrium with platforms EL ¼
0:9 ¼ ER; L ¼ 0:3 ¼ R for which each extreme party garners 1.96% of
the votes while moderate parties each have 48.04%.We thenmodify the distribution
function to introduce some positive skewness by modeling f as a Beta(4.5, 5)
distribution. We have to modify the parties’ blisspoints so that condition (21) holds.
In absence of explicit modeling of the parties’ blisspoint determination, we choose a
configuration of parties’ blisspoints where all blisspoints slide slightly to the left
when the distribution becomes positively skewed. More precisely, we assume thatbEL ¼ 0:85; bL ¼ 0:468; bR ¼ 0:35 and bEL ¼ 0:75 . We then obtain that the
conditions listed in Proposition 8 are satisfied so that there exists an equilibrium
with platforms EL ¼ 0:95; L ¼ 0:368; R ¼ 0:25 and EL ¼ 0:85 for
which moderate parties tie for winning with 47.89% of the votes each. Note also
that, as stated above, the extreme parties do not have the same number of votes at
equilibrium, with 1.82% for party EL and 2.4% for party ER.
6 Conclusion
This paper constitutes an attempt to formalize electoral competition with more than
two parties. Two main results emerge. First, equilibrium existence with four parties
competing for election is unlikely under plurality unless one places bounds on the
promises that parties can credibly make. Second, the introduction of extreme
parties induces moderate parties to propose more extreme policies under plurality
whereas we obtain the converse effect in a proportional system.
We have tested the robustness of our results with respect to two departures from
our basic assumptions. First, we add a first stage where parties decide whether to
run for elections or not before choosing their electoral platform. We show that most
of our results still hold, in the sense that there exist parameters values for which the
Nash equilibria of Sections 3 and 4 also constitute subgame perfect Nash equilibria
of this sequential game.
We also generalize our results to the case of an asymmetric distribution of
voters’ blisspoints. Results for the proportional case are basically unaffected, with
the median policy appearing explicitly in the formulas. As for the plurality rule, for
the results to carry through requires two modifications. First, unlike in the pure
symmetric case, it is now necessary to check the incentives to deviate of all the
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parties, and not only of the, say, leftist parties. This requirement does not threaten
the robustness of our results with respect to small departures from a symmetric
distribution function. With a symmetric distribution function, incentives to deviate
for parties L and R are identical. By continuity, they remain very close when
considering small departures from the symmetry of the distribution function. We
illustrate this reasoning by mean of a numerical example.
The second modification required by the introduction of an asymmetric
distribution function is to modify the winning parties’ blisspoints in order to keep
the symmetry of these platforms. In absence of such a modification, one party
would win the election for sure. It is difficult to think of this situation as a long term
equilibrium. Opposing parties would then have a strong incentive to move to
increase their chance of getting elected. Since credibility prevents parties from
moving further from their blisspoint, it seems reasonable to think that the
blisspoints themselves will move with time. We do not explicitly model the process
of parties’ blisspoints determination in this paper, but simply state the symmetry
condition that is needed for our results to generalize to asymmetric distribution
functions. We plan to endogeneize this determination in future work.
We believe that these results are of interest, allowing to explain some of the
features of the political systems in European countries, in which many political
parties are active. As one referee pointed out, many democracies exhibit three
parties, one at the center of the policy spectrum and one on each side. Although the
main focus of this paper is on the impact of the introduction of extreme parties on
the platforms proposed by moderates, our model enables us to shed some light on
the effect of a centrist party on the moderates’ decisions. We consider three
symmetric parties and a symmetric distribution function f, so that the center party
C’s ideal policy is at 0. We have already seen in Section 5.1.2 that the symmetric
equilibrium under proportional representation is such that the center party proposes
zero and gathers one half of the votes while the L and R parties each get one fourth.
The implemented policy is zero, the same as when C does not run. Party C is then
indifferent whether to run or not.
We now turn to the plurality case. It is easily seen that at equilibrium, the center
party proposes its ideal policy while the other two parties locate as close to the
center as is credible.13 The incentives faced by the two moderate parties are
basically the same as in the two party case. The implemented policy is either zero
(sure victory of C, in which case the moderate parties are in fact indifferent as to
their location) or a lottery between either the two moderate platforms or the three
platforms with in both cases an expected policy of zero.
We now check whether this three party equilibrium is a SPNE of the sequential
game where parties choose first to enter and then their platform. A moderate party,
by not entering, guarantees the sure victory of party C with a platform of zero. It is
then indifferent as to whether to enter if the three party equilibrium also results in
the sure victory of party C. On the other hand, if the three party equilibrium is a
lottery (whose expected result is still zero), a risk averse moderate party will not run
for elections. This suggests that the three-party configuration is not very stable.14
13 It is well known that no equilibrium exists in absence of credibility sets.
14 It is reminiscent of the results obtained by Palfrey (1984) in a three party model where two
parties (simultaneously) choose their platform before the third one. In this model where parties
maximize their plurality, the third party locates in between the other two but never wins the
elections.
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1 Appendix
Before proving Proposition 1, we state the following useful lemma whose proof is
immediate and left to the reader.
Lemma 1 if bEL ¼ bER  1=2 then
1) EL (resp. ER) prefers any policy x < 0 (resp. x > 0) to any policy y > 0 (resp.
y < 0)
2) Fix any policy x > 0 (resp. x < 0). Then, EL (resp. ER) prefers any policy smaller
(resp. larger) than x to policy x.
Proof of Proposition 1 (i) Symmetric equilibrium.
Four cases must be distinguished:
1) EL < L < R ¼ L < ER ¼ EL
In such a symmetric equilibrium, either all parties tie for victory or only two (the
two moderate or the two extreme ones) do. If only two tie for victory, one sure
loser can always ensure the victory of the party whose platform it prefers (i.e.
the party on the same side of the political spectrum) by deviating.15 If all parties
tie for victory, each extreme party has an incentive to adopt a less extreme
position in order to attract votes from moderate individuals.
2) EL ¼ L < R ¼ ER ¼ L
Platforms L and R are implemented with probability 1/2. If EL deviates
slightly to the left, then either L or EL is elected for sure and EL is better off.
Therefore EL should deviate.
3) EL < L ¼ R ¼ 0 < ER ¼ EL
As in case 1, extreme parties should deviate (marginally) towards the center
when their probability of winning is not 0. In the converse case, a sufficiently
large deviation towards the center allows an extreme party to be elected for sure
with a preferred policy (without deviating, the policy implemented is 0).
4) EL ¼ L ¼ R ¼ ER ¼ 0
A left (resp. right) party deviates to the left (resp. right) and wins for sure with a
policy it prefers to 0.
(ii) Asymmetric equilibrium.
We first study the case where two or more candidates tie for victory. We treat
separately the cases where winners offer different platforms and the case where
they make the same offer. We first claim that, if parties tying for victory offer
different platforms, extreme parties always have an incentive to deviate. A first
15 If only extremes tie for winning, a moderate party should deviate towards the center. If only
moderates tie, an extreme should propose a more extreme platform if feasible or should leapfrog
the closest moderate to locate just next to the other moderate but closer to the center.
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subcase arises when (at least) one of the tied winners is an extreme party. Three
possibilities open up:
– the extreme party prefers its own platform to the platform proposed by any other
tied winner. The extreme party then has an incentive to deviate towards the
center, which ensures it to win the election.
– the extreme party is indifferent between its platform and that proposed by
another tied winner. Its most preferred platform then lies in between these two
platforms, and deviating towards the center allows it to win with a platform
closer to its most preferred one.
– the extreme party prefers another tied winner’s platform to its own. W.l.og.,
assume that this extreme party is EL. We first prove that the only platform that
could be preferred by EL to its own is that proposed by L. The argument consists
in two steps. First, it is impossible to have an equilibrium situation with tied
winners and three proposed platforms on the same side of 0. In such a case, the
extreme party with the only platform on a given side of 0 would win for sure by
moving sufficiently closed to 0, and Lemma 1 guarantees that it would benefit
from this move. Second, since two platforms must be located on each side of 0,
Lemma 1 ensures that the only policy who might be preferred by an extreme
party to its own is that proposed by its neighbor. Finally, if EL prefers the policy
proposed by L to its own, and if both tie for winning, than EL can guarantee that
L win for sure by deviating to −1.
The second subcase of tied winners with different platforms that we consider is
that where no extreme party ties for winning, i.e. when the two moderate parties tie
for winning with different platforms. In this case, it is impossible for both extreme
parties to be indifferent between the policies proposed by L and R, and any non-
indifferent extreme party can guarantee the victory of the moderate policy it prefers
by moving to a slightly less extreme platform than the moderate party it does not
like.
We now show that the situation where tied winners offer the same platform
cannot be an equilibrium either. The reasoning above shows that no equilibrium
can have three parties proposing the same policy (and thus ending up on the same
side of 0) and tying for winning. We then have to treat the two following cases: one
extreme and one moderate parties tying, and two moderates tying. Consider the
first case, where EL and L tie for winning. They must propose a policy x < 0 (or else
EL would be better off by deviating to the left and win the elections). Moreover, to
tie for winning, EL and L must together win more than half of the votes, which
means that the policy proposed by R (and a fortiori by ER) must be greater than |x|.
But then, ER has an incentive to move to the immediate left of |x| in order to win the
election or make R win with a policy that it prefers to x < 0 according to Lemma 1.
The other case with tied winners offering the same platform would involve both L
and R proposing the same policy x. If x differs from 0, the extreme party located on
the other side of zero would win outright by moving sufficiently close to zero (once
more, lemma 1 ensures that this party benefits from this move). If x = 0, any
extreme party would win by moving sufficiently close to zero and would benefit
from this move.
We consider next the possibility of an equilibrium with one party being the sure
winner. We first treat the case where the winner is a moderate party. Suppose w.l.o.g.
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that this is party R. Its location must then be bR , otherwise R would have an
incentive to move closer to its ideal point.
The number of votes obtained by each party when they propose different
policies is
nEL ¼ F ELþL2
  ¼ A
nL ¼ F LþbR2  F LþEL2  ¼ B
nR ¼ F bRþER2  F bRð Þ þ F bRð Þ  F LþbR2  ¼ Dþ C
nER ¼ 1 F bRþER2  ¼ E:
If EL deviates to bR  " , with " small, we have
nEL ¼ F bRð Þ  F LþbR2  ¼ C
nL ¼ F LþbR2  ¼ Aþ B
nR ¼ F bRþER2  F bRð Þ ¼ D
nER ¼ 1 F bRþER2  ¼ E:
If Aþ B > max C; D; Ef g , L is elected and implements αL. Since bEL  1=2,
EL prefers any policy to the left of bR to bR and has therefore an incentive to
deviate. If C > max Aþ B; D; Ef g , EL is elected with a more favorable policy
than bR . On the other hand, if max D; Ef g > max Aþ B; Cf g , R or ER are
elected and EL should not deviate. However, if ER deviates to bR þ " , with " small,
then nEL = A, nL = B, nR = C, nER = D + E. Therefore, in the case max D; Ef g
max Aþ B; Cf g, ER is elected if it deviates and obtains a better policy.
Observe that this proof relies on the assumption that EL can credibly commit to
the policy bEL ¼ bR  " . Moreover the reasoning extends to the case where αEL =
αL.
Suppose now that party ER is the winner. By the same argument presented
above, the platform chosen by this party must be bER . Assumed for the moment
that all parties propose different platforms. In this case, the number of votes for
each party is given by:
nER ¼ 1 F bERð Þ þ F bERð Þ  F RþbER2  ¼ Aþ B
nR ¼ F RþbER2  F LþR2  ¼ C
nL ¼ F LþR2
  F ELþL2  ¼ D
nEL ¼ F ELþL2
  ¼ E:
If EL deviates to bER  " , we get nER = A, nR = C, nL = D + E and nEL = B.
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Three cases must be distinguished:
– Dþ E 2 max A; B; C; Dþ Ef g : L wins or ties;
– C 2 max A; B; C; Dþ Ef g : R wins or ties;
– B 2 max A; B; C; Dþ Ef g : EL wins or ties.
In all these three cases, EL is better off following the deviation since it prefers
any policy to the left of bER to bER . Finally, note that, under (3), A cannot be the
(strict) maximum of A, B, C and D + E, since A ≤ 1/4 means that one of the three
other parties must receive at least 1/4 of the votes. Finally, the reader can check that
the logic of this proof (EL deviating to bER  " and ending up with a preferred
policy) extends to the cases where the platforms of some parties (except of course
ER) coincide.
Proof of Proposition 2 (i) We examine the deviations available to parties EL and L,
the cases of parties R and ER being symmetric.
Deviations by EL. We first show that condition (4) implies that extreme parties
are sure losers and that party EL does not gain by deviating. Party EL maximizes
the number of votes it obtains by moving to bEL þ d in which case it gets






















850which is condition (4). Notice further that this condition, together with the
symmetry of the equilibrium, ensures that both intermediate parties receive more
than one fourth of the vote and thus tie for victory. It follows from this analysis that
EL should not deviate to the right, since it would not win and would cause party R
to win for sure. Therefore condition (4) is sufficient (but not necessary) to ensure
that party EL does not want to deviate to the right.
A deviation to the left by party EL is not profitable either. The policy announced
would not be believed by the voters who would anticipate the choice of bEL by EL
if elected. This would then be equivalent to a deviation to the right by EL.
Deviations by L. As before a deviation to the left by L is equivalent to a deviation
to bL . We then look at deviations to the right by party L. We write the number of
votes received by parties L and R as a function of the location of party L, αL:
nL Lð Þ ¼ F LþR2
  F LþEL2 
¼ F LþbRþd2  F LþbELd2 
and
nR Lð Þ ¼ F RþER2
  F LþR2 
¼ F bRþbER2 þ d  F LþbLþd2 
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When moving to the right, L receives additional votes from people previously
supporting R. However it also loses votes to EL. A sufficient condition for any
deviation to the right from L ¼ bL  d not to be profitable for party L is that
nL−nR be strictly decreasing on the whole credibility interval, i.e. to have
2f




L þ bEL  d
2
 
for all L 2 bL  d; bL þ d½  . Then R is elected for sure and L is strictly worse off.
Note that this condition is satisfied only if the distribution of ideal points has at
least two modes, since for L ¼ bL  d the condition reduces to





(ii) Party EL maximizes the number of votes it obtains by moving to bEL þ d in
which case it gets a number of votes equal to F bELþbL2 þ d . This is less than F bLð Þ
since bEL þ d  bL  d . Condition (6) then ensures that EL does not deviate
towards the center and that moderate parties tie for winning. The proof that L does
not wish to deviate follows the same line as above, using condition (7) instead of
(5).
Proof of Proposition 3 (i) Position of EL. At equilibrium, we must necessarily have
EL ¼ bEL þ d , otherwise EL would have an incentive to make a small deviation
to the right and become the winner for sure. A marginal move to the left would give
rise to the victory of party ER and is therefore not desirable from the point of view
of party EL.
Position of L. A marginal deviation to the left by L would lead to the election of
ER. Because EL ¼ ER and bL < 0 , L prefers that EL be elected rather than ER.
At equilibrium, we cannot have L < bL þ d , or L would prefer to deviate toward
the center in order to ensure the election of EL.
(ii) We have to show that, for the configuration of platforms derived in (i), the
extreme parties garner more votes than the center ones. The number of votes
received by EL and L at equilibrium are given by
nEL þ F bL þ bEL2 þ d
 
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and













This is always true if (8) is satisfied.
The analysis in (i) has shown that no party has an interest to slightly deviate from
its position. By continuity, no party has an incentive to deviate at all provided that d
is low enough.
(iii) The sufficient conditions for an equilibrium not to exist are derived from the
following observations. First, we write the number of votes obtained by party L
when EL deviates to EL ¼ bEL  d :
nLjEL¼bELd ¼ 12 F bL þ bEL2
 
:
Moreover, we have that the number of votes received by ER is not affected by
this deviation:
nER ¼ F bL þ bEL2 þ d
 
 min F bEL  bL
2
 
; F bLð Þ ;
where the inequality follows from the fact that bL þ d  0 and bEL þ d  bL  d
(following the assumption that the credibility sets do not overlap). Then if (9) is
satisfied, nL is larger than nER (which is itself larger than nR and nEL) and L is the
winner of the election. Condition (10) simply states that EL prefers that L be the
winner alone rather than a tie between EL and ER.










v0R ð Þ ¼ 0:
In a symmetric equilibrium, α = 0. Therefore bL <  (resp. bR >  ) and
v0L ð Þ < 0 (resp. v0R ð Þ > 0 ). It follows that the first-order conditions for an


































R ¼ 0: (27)
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This yields
L ¼ R ¼  12f 0ð Þ











¼ f 0ð Þ þ 12  0:
Therefore αL=−1 and αR = 1 is a local equilibrium when f (0) ≤ 1/2.
It remains to be shown that the second-order conditions are satisfied for the





v00L ð Þ þ d
2
d2L
v0L ð Þ < 0:
If f (0) > 1/2, we have d=dL ¼ 0 and v0L ð Þ < 0 when L ¼ R ¼ 1=2f
0ð Þ . A sufficient condition for d2L=d2L < 0 is then d2=d2L > 0 . Dividing the





  ¼ 1
2














L  Rð Þ fF
 0
:
At equilibrium, recalling that αR = 1/2 f (0) > 0, party L should never play αL ≥
αR. Therefore αL−αR < 0. If (f/F)′ ≤ 0, dA/dαL is positive. Knowing that
F L þ Rð Þ=2ð Þ is increasing with αL, necessarily dα/dαL must be increasing
with αL, that is d2=d2L > 0 .





v00R ð Þ þ
d2
d2R
v0R ð Þ < 0:
If f (0) > 1/2, we have dα/dαR = 0 and vR0 (α) > 0 when αL = −αR = −1/2f (0). A
sufficient condition for d2L=d2L < 0 is then d
2=d2L < 0: Dividing the left





  ¼ 1
2















L  Rð Þ f1 F
 0
:
This expression is negative if f = 1 Fð Þð Þ0  0 . One can show that, when
the distribution function is symmetric, the two conditions, f =Fð Þ0  0 and
f = 1 Fð Þð Þ0  0 , are equivalent.
Proof of Proposition 5 Following (2a)–(2d) and (12), we have:
 ¼ F EL þ L
2
 
EL þ F L þ R2
 




þ F R þ ER
2
 
 F L þ R
2
  
R þ 1 F R þ ER2
  
ER:

































From the first-order condition on αEL, one immediately sees that αEL < αL at an
interior equilibrium.
Using (28) together with the symmetry of the solution, (29) becomes
2F EL þ L
2
 






Comparing this with the result for two party competition, one immediately sees
that moderate platforms are closer to 0 with four parties than with 2. Furthermore,
we obtain that F EL þ Lð Þ=2ð Þ < 1=4 at an interior equilibrium.
We next verify that the above result (moderate platforms closer to the center
with four parties) holds true when some parties propose corner platforms. When
f (0) ≤ 1/2, the two parties competition leads to corner solutions. The outcome
with four parties cannot then be more extreme in such a case. We now prove
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that the moderate platform is closer to the center with four parties when



















As soon as f (0) > 1/2, this expression is negative. Hence the conclusion. Observe
that this implies that a full corner solution is impossible when f (0) > 1/2.
We now turn to the second-order conditions. The proof that d2=d2EL > 0 is
similar to the proof for party L in the two party case. As for party L, making use
of (28), (29) becomes
d
dL
¼ f EL þ L
2
 




L  Rð Þ þ F L þ R2
 
:
We have already shown in the proof for party L in the two party case that the sum
of the second and third terms is increasing in αL provided that f (x)/F(x) is
decreasing with x. Using the same technique (i.e. dividing by F EL þ Lð Þ=2ð Þ
and then differentiating with respect to αL), it is easy to show that the first term is
also increasing in αL under the same conditions. We thus obtain that the second-
order conditions are satisfied in this case. Using similar arguments, one can verify
that the second-order conditions for parties R and ER are satisfied if f (x)/(1−F(x)) is
increasing with x, which is equivalent to the requirement that f(x)/F(x) is decreasing
with x for a symmetrical f (x).
Proof of Proposition 6 The first-order conditions are still given by Eqs. (26)
and (27) in the Proof of Proposition 4. Together, they imply that F LþR2
  ¼ 12 so
that αL = 2med−αR. Put together with (26), one then obtains (18) and (19). These
two values are admissible if they both belong to the interval [−1,1], i.e. if f medð Þ





If med < 0, we can have a full corner equilibrium (αL = −1, αR = 1) or a partial
corner equilibrium. In this last case, 12 1medð Þ < f medð Þ < 12 1þmedð Þ and αL = −1.
First order conditions are then given by
d
dL









1þ Rð Þ  0; (30)
d
dR









1þ Rð Þ ¼ 0 (31)
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i.e. that the left party gets more than one half of the votes. It then follows that α < 0.
Ifmed < 0 and f medð Þ < 12 1medð Þ < 12 1þmedð Þ , we can have a full corner equilibrium
(αL = −1, αR = 1) with α=1−2F(0) < 0.
The proof for the second-order condition is identical to that of Proposition 4
since αL < med < αR.
Proof of Proposition 7 First-order conditions for a symmetric interior equilibrium
are still given by Eqs. (28) and (29) in Proposition 5’s proof. Together, they imply
that
2F EL þ L
2
 
þ L  medð Þf medð Þ þ 12 ¼ 0
which means that
L ¼ med 
1 4F ELþL2
 
2f medð Þ :
Comparing this with the result for two party competition, one immediately sees
that moderate platforms are closer to 0 with four parties than with 2. Furthermore,
we obtain that F ELþL2
 
< 14 at an interior equilibrium.
We next verify that the above result (moderate platforms closer to the center with
four parties) holds true when some parties propose corner platforms. We
concentrate on the positively skewed case where two party competition leads to
an interior equilibrium f medð Þ > 12 1þmedð Þ
 
and compute ddL in the four party case
where αEL = −1, αER = 1 and αL and αR are located at their interior equilibrium








med  1 12f medð Þ
2
 !








As soon as f medð Þ > 12 1þmedð Þ , this expression is negative. Hence the conclusion
that L’s platform is closer to med than in the two party case. The proof for party R
runs similarly.
The analysis of the second-order condition is identical to Proposition 5’s proof
since αEL < αL < med < αR < αER.
Proof of Proposition 8 Condition (21) implies that the two moderate parties have
the same number of votes. We can replicate the part of the proof of Proposition 2
(ii) that excludes deviations from EL. The sufficient condition for this is given by
(22). Similarly, Condition (23) guarantees that ER does not win by deviating.
We can replicate the part of the proof of Proposition 2 (ii) that excludes
deviations from L. The sufficient condition for this is condition (24). Similarly,
Condition (25) guarantees that R does not win by deviating.
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